We consider the welfare effect of parallel imports under the possibility of piracy, by constructing a model of the monopoly firm selling its product in a developed country and in a developing country. We show that parallel imports does not always make the firm worse off and consumers better off. Sometimes parallel imports benefit both the firm and the consumers, irrespective of the existence of piracy. However, piracy makes parallel imports more preferable to the consumers and less preferable to the firm. We also suggest that a policy regarding piracy can be internationally coordinated with a policy regarding parallel imports.
Introduction
When products embodying intellectual property are imported from one country to another without authorization of a holder of intellectual property right, such imports are called parallel imports.
The products subject to parallel importing are widely ranged, from clothing to automobiles, cigarettes to pharmaceutical products, perfumes to home appliances.
In Japan, an example of parallel importing is music CDs from East Asian countries. Since the 1990's, Japanese record labels have started to sell Japanese music CDs in East Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as popularity of Japanese pop music increasing in these countries. Because of lower income levels in these countries, the CDs are sold at a price far below that in Japan. Although jacket design or language of the brochure would be different from "Japanese version" CDs, since the contents are almost identical, those "Asian version" CDs are imported to Japan, and sold to Japanese consumers at cheaper prices. Recently, there has been a sharp increase in such parallel imports of Japanese pop music CDs, which consequently provoked considerable public discussion over pros and cons of allowing those imports. The main trade-off considered in the public discussion is that restricting parallel imports would protect the profit of record labels by sacrificing consumers' benefit of being able to buy cheaper CDs. In this sense, parallel imports are considered as the same as illegal copies or product piracy, since they harm the owners of intellectual property right. However, it should be noticed that parallel imports are different from product piracy, since the sales of parallel imports become revenue to the intellectual property right owners, while the sales of pirated CDs do not. This paper is motivated by the above discussion of parallel imports of Japanese music CDs. Of course, however, we would like to maintain our analysis as general as possible to make our results applicable to any kind of goods subject to parallel importing. One of the objectives of this paper is thus to investigate whether and under what condition allowing parallel importing is beneficial to the firms, consumers, and a country as a whole. In particular, we are interested in a situation where the main reason of parallel importing is in the income-level differences of the countries, and parallel imports are considered as a low-quality version of the product.
As we explained above, the goods subject to parallel importing are, in many cases, intellectual property right products. However, surprisingly, in economics, there are few formal, analytical researches of parallel imports that explicitly take account of the issues of intellectual property right protection. Thus, in this paper, as a first step toward incorporating explicitly the issues of intellectual property right into the analysis of parallel imports, we are going to consider a situation where the product subject to parallel importing is also subject to product piracy. Another objective of this paper is thus to examine how the existence of piracy changes the welfare effect of parallel imports.
In the existing literature of analyzing parallel imports, there are three types of researches. One type is to consider that parallel imports are to invalidate the third-degree price discrimination, as discussed by Malueg-Schwartz (1994) . The papers by Richardson (2002) , and Knox-Richardson (2002) , are seen as extensions of Malueg-Schwartz. Another type is to look at parallel imports in the context of vertical price control, suggested by Maskus-Chen (2004) . The third type is to consider parallel imports as a device of the second-degree price discrimination, noticing that parallel imports are often regarded as a low quality version of the product. Anderson-Ginsburgh (1999) and Ahmadi-Yang (2000) are the papers of this type. This paper belongs to the third type, and related to Anderson-Ginsburgh and Ahmadi-Yang, but we are going to make more discussions about the effect of allowing/banning parallel imports on profits, consumer surpluses and welfare.
A recent paper by Cosac (2003) is a hybrid of the second type and the third type. The basic structure of our model is similar to Cosac's, but our motivation and interest are quite different from hers. That is, she is interested in examining manufacturer-retailer relationships in identical two countries, while we are interested in investigating welfare effects of parallel imports with the possibility of product piracy, in a model of two different countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly explain the setting of the model. Then, from section 3 we start our analysis of parallel imports without piracy.
Product piracy is incorporated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
The outline of the model
We consider two countries, the home country and the foreign country, and suppose that the home country is a developed country and the foreign country is a developing country. The differences of the home country and the foreign country are modeled in terms of the following three points: (1) creation of a new product, (2) income level, and (3) the protection of intellectual property rights.
First, we assume that it is only the firm in the home country which creates an intellectual property right product. The firm creating a new product, referred to as the monopolist, is going to sell its product in both countries. In this model, we suppose that the monopolist sells "home version" for the home consumers, and "foreign version" for the foreign consumers. Although these two versions are intrinsically the same, they are packaged differently. Such a difference is made in order to suit the different tastes, customs, or languages of the two countries. For example, different versions of a music CD have different jacket pictures and different brochure, although the contents of the CD are the same. Second, we model that the income level of the foreign consumers are on average lower than that of the home consumers. Consequently, the monopolist will set the price of home version higher than the price of foreign version as long as the two markets are segmented. However, if the arbitrage cost is low enough, the price difference between two countries give an opportunity of parallel importing, that is, importing the foreign-versioned products and selling them to the home consumers, without authorization of the monopolist. We assume that the home consumers think of imported foreign version as a low-quality substitute of home version, because foreign version is made less suitable for the home consumers. Another reason why imported foreign version is considered having a lower quality is that it comes with no warranty, because it is imported without the authorization of the monopolist.
Third, we suppose that protection of intellectual property rights is weak in the foreign country, so that the product originally created in the home country is copied, or pirated, and those pirated versions are sold in the foreign country. The foreign consumers presume that quality of the pirated version is lower than that of foreign version. We assume that the enforcement of intellectual property rights is strong enough in the home country, thus pirated version is not produced in, nor imported to, the home country.
In each country, there is a continuum of consumers, who are indexed by their income levels, θ. In the home country, θ is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, with the population per type equal to one. Thus, the total population of the home consumers is normalized to one. In the foreign country, θ is distributed between 0 and η, with the population per type given by A. The total population of the foreign consumers is thus equal to Aη. We assume that 0 < η < 1 since the foreign consumers are supposed to have lower income. In addition, we assume that Aη > 1, supposing that the total population of the foreign country is larger than that of the home country.
The utility of a type-θ consumer is given as follows. 1 If he buys the product of quality s at the price p, his utility is equal to s (θ − p). For the home consumers, the quality of home version is equal to 1, and that of imported foreign version is α, where 0 < α < 1. Similarly, for the foreign consumers the quality of foreign version is 1, and that of pirated version is β, where 0 < β < In the following section, we analyze the case o and the case i, and compare these two cases.
Then, in Section 4, we will look at the cases of piracy, i.e., the case c and the case ic.
3 A model without piracy
No parallel imports without piracy: the case o
First of all, we consider the case where there is no piracy of the product in the foreign country, and there is no parallel imports in the home country, due to, say, the prohibitively high arbitrage cost or the government policy. Here, the case of no parallel imports without piracy, to which we give a shorthand name "the case o", can be analyzed as a standard model of monopoly. Let p h denote the price of home version in the home country, and p f denote the price of foreign version in the foreign country. In the home country, the home consumer whose θ is equal to p h is indifferent between buying home version and not buying. Therefore the demand for home version in the home country is given by
Similarly, the demand for foreign version in the foreign country is
Now, look at the price choice of the monopolist. To simplify the algebra, we assume that the marginal cost of production is constant and equal to zero. Then, we have the following standard profit-maximization problem of the monopolist:
where p = (p h , p f ). The solution to this problem, denoted by p o , is
Then, we can calculate the profit of the monopolist:
The consumer surplus of the home country when there are no parallel imports is denoted by CS 
When these are evaluated at p o ,
Parallel imports without foreign demand
Since the home consumers think of parallel imports as a low-quality substitute of home version, for the monopolist, parallel imported products work as a device to price discriminate the home consumers thorough self selection (that is, the monopolist is able to make the second-degree price discrimination). To isolate this price-discriminating effect of parallel imports, here we consider a hypothetical situation where there is no demand for the product in the foreign country, but the monopolist still sells foreign version, solely in order to let the foreign-versioned products imported back to the home country. We assume that parallel importing is perfectly competitive, and that the marginal cost of transportation is constant and equal to t. Then, the price of imported foreign version in the home country is equal to p f + t.
sumers. One marginal consumer is indifferent between buying home version and buying imported foreign version. This consumer is found from θ − p h = α (θ − p f − t). Then, the demand for home version, when foreign version is available through parallel importing, is
where the superscript i (stands for "imports") is to denote the existence of parallel imports.
The other marginal consumer is indifferent between buying the foreign version and not buying.
This consumer is simply θ = p f + t. Thus, the demand for imported foreign version, denoted by
Given these demand functions, the monopolist's profit-maximization problem, when there is no demand in the foreign county, is
where we use the tilde sign to denote the case of no foreign demand. The first-order conditions are
which gives the solutionp
We can calculate thatp
Thus, in order to have D i (p) > 0, it must be that 1 − α − 2t > 0. Otherwise, parallel importing will not occur, and the monopolist simply chooses p = p o . So, we restrict our attention to the set of parameters such that 1 − α − 2t > 0 is satisfied. Now, let us compare the results here with the results of the case o. First, it is shown that, when foreign version works solely as a device of the second-degree price discrimination, the price of the home version is above, and the price of the imported foreign version is below, the standard monopoly price of the home market:
Second, we calculate the profit of the monopolist
and compare this with
, in order to show that the monopolist's profit from the home market is higher when foreign version serves as a device of the second-degree price discrimination.
That is,Π
Finally, let us look at the consumer surplus. Let CS i h (p) denote the consumer surplus of the home country when there are parallel imports.
Then, by comparing CS
we can see that the home consumers are worse off when imported foreign version is available:
We summarize these results below.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is no demand in the foreign country.
(1) When there is parallel importing, the price of home version is above, and the price of imported foreign version is below the standard monopoly price.
(2)Parallel imports make the monopolist better off and the home consumers worse off.
Parallel imports without piracy: the case i
Now we are ready to analyze the price decision of the monopolist when there is parallel importing and when there is demand for the product in the foreign country. The profit maximization of the monopolist in this case is given by
The first-order conditions are
denote the solution to the first-order conditions (3). For p i to be actually chosen by the monopolist, it must be that D i (p i ) > 0 (otherwise parallel importing will not occur).
Furthermore, even when
that is, when the monopolist choosing the prices as if there is no parallel importing, it may actually result in no parallel importing. Since our interest is to investigate how the introduction of parallel imports will change the price decision, we want to confine the parameter space such that the parallel importing will occur when it is allowed. To guarantee this, we impose the condition 1 − η − 2t > 0, on top of the condition 1 − α − 2t > 0. Notice that 
and ∂Π (p) /∂p f is deceasing in p f , we see that p The intuition is straightforward. When the foreign-versioned products are sold only to the foreign buyers, the optimal price is equal to p o f . On the other hand, when they are sold only to the home buyers as a low-quality substitute of home version, the monopolist should set p f =p f .
Therefore, in the present case where parallel imports are allowed and there is nonzero foreign demand, the monopolist has to balance the marginal profit from the home market and that from the foreign market. The result is that p i f is set between the two extremes,p f and p o f .
Although we are interested in to which direction the price of home version and that of foreign version are changed, Lemma 1 alone does not determine whether the prices rise or fall as parallel imports are allowed. However, at least, it is certain that when one of the prices falls, the other does not fall.
Proposition 2 When parallel imports are allowed, if one price falls, then the other price does not fall.
Proof. Suppose that both prices fall:
To derive more specific results, we have to rely on the algebraic solution to the first order conditions (3), which is
Using this explicit solution, we are now able to give the following proposition about the effect of parallel imports on the prices.
Proof. A straightforward calculation gives that
The intuition of the proposition is seen as follows. Recall that α represents the quality level of imported foreign version relative to that of home version, and that η can be thought of as the income level of the foreign country relative to that of the home country. The condition η ≤ α essentially means that the income level of the foreign country is relatively far from that of the home country, while the quality of imported foreign version is relatively close to that of home version. In such a case, p We now turn to examine the profit of the monopolist. The proposition below tells us that the monopolist prefers parallel imports if income level of the foreign country is close enough to the level of the home country, and if the quality of imported foreign version is not very close to that of home version.
Then, note that the first two terms are rewritten as follows:
Since
The last inequality is from the definition of p i . Since p i is unique, the strict inequality holds
The intuition is as follows. When the income level of the foreign country is close to the level of the home country, the monopolist is going to set p f close to p h . At the same time, however, as foreign version is not a very good substitute (i.e., α is small), the optimal price gap between home version and foreign version will be large. So, this allows the monopolist to set p
extracting more from high-income consumers while not losing low-income consumers in the home country, making price discrimination successful. Notice that the best situation for the monopolist is where it achieves the most effective price discrimination in the home market, without sacrificing at all the profit from the foreign market. In this best situation,
The example below demonstrates that when this best situation happens, then it is η > α.
, the monopolist is receiving the maximum profit from the home market, without sacrificing at all from the foreign market. Using the expressions forp f and p
. Then, it is straightforward to see that 2
Since η ≥ α is just a sufficient condition for
holds for any parameter values. The example below, however, suggests that
can actually happen when η is small enough relative to α.
Example 2 First, we show that
Then, what we need to do next is to demonstrate that p 
When 1−α−2t is very close to zero while η −α is negative enough, this can be negative. Therefore,
can happen when η is small enough relative to α.
to choose a narrow price difference between home version and foreign version in order to make price discrimination successful. However, as the income level of the foreign firm is very low (i.e., η is low), the price of foreign version should be kept low enough in order not to lose the foreign customers, which in turn hampers successful price discrimination. Therefore, instead of increasing the price of foreign version very much, the monopolist has to somewhat lower the price of the home version to narrow the price difference, which deteriorates the profit of the monopolist. Hence the profit falls as parallel importing is allowed in this case.
On the other hand, for the home consumers, such a case that η ≤ α is preferable, since in this case imported foreign version is close substitute of home version and sold at a reasonable price, and at the same time, the price of home version is lower. This argument is formalized in the proposition below.
Proof. We rewrite CS
as follows:
The first term is positive. The second term is positive if p However, as the results of our analysis suggest, the casual perception is not necessarily true. In Cosac (2003) where home version and foreign version are differentiated but two countries are identical, it is shown that the monopolist is better off and the consumers are worse off by parallel importing. On the other hand, we found that whether parallel importing is beneficial or harmful to the monopolist and to the home consumers is in general ambiguous. Moreover, in contrast to the results of previous papers, our model showed that the interests of the monopolist and the consumers are not always in conflict. Proposition 4 and 5 combined tells us that both the consumers and the monopolist prefer allowing parallel imports when η = α. Then, from this result, we can immediately infer that welfare of the home country, which is the sum of the monopolist's profit and the home consumer surplus, is increased by parallel imports when η and α are close enough.
In order to have more complete results about the welfare effect of the parallel imports, we now proceed to a graphical representation of the results. Let us consider η-t plane, and draw a curve Figure 1 . In this figure, the small arrows indicate the direction to which the parallel importing becomes preferred to no parallel importing).
[ Figure 1 here.]
. Then, using the graph, we fix the location of the W i (p i ) − W o (p o ) = 0 curve, and derive the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If CS
Proof. See appendix B.
This proposition shows that even when the monopolist loses by parallel imports, the consumers' gain is large enough to offset the loss of the monopolist. A policy implication of this proposition would be as follows. For the government pursuing welfare maximization, it should ban parallel imports only if the consumers do not like it, which occurs when η > α.
Before closing this section, we mention the effect of allowing parallel imports on the foreign consumer surplus. Since parallel importing does not change the functional form of the foreign consumer surplus, we can simply calculate
2 . In this section we are going to look at the case where the product of the monopolist is pirated in the foreign country. First, as a benchmark, consider the product piracy when parallel imports are not allowed. This case is called "the case c."
In the foreign country, now two versions of the product are available. One is foreign version sold by the monopolist (which is the authentic one), and the other is "pirated version" sold by pirates.
Recall that in our model the foreign consumers can distinguish pirate version from authentic foreign version, and pirate version is considered as a lower quality version of foreign version. As we have assumed that parallel importers are perfectly competitive, here we suppose that pirates are perfectly competitive. Assuming the constant marginal cost of making a pirated copy equal to c, we have the price of the pirated version just equal to c. Then, one marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying foreign version and buying pirate version is found by θ −p f = β (θ − c).
The foreign demand for foreign version, when there is pirated version, is thus given by
where the superscript c (stands for "copies") on D f is to denote the existence of pirates. The other marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying pirate version and not buying is simply θ = c. So the foreign demand for pirated version is
The profit maximization problem of the monopolist is
The solution to this problem, denoted by p c , is given by
Here, to see the effect of piracy, we compare the results in the case c with the results in the case o. When there are no parallel imports, piracy does not have any impact on the home market, thus the price of home version in the case c is the same as that in the case o. The effect of piracy here is simply to lower the demand for foreign version, and hence to lower the price of foreign version. Consequently, the profit of the monopolist is smaller in the case c than in the case o:
The home consumer surplus here is the same as that of no piracy case since p
On the other hand, the foreign consumer surplus has now the different functional form. Let CS c f (p) denote the foreign consumer surplus when there is piracy:
, we can show that the foreign consumers are, of course, better off by the pirates.
This is positive since p 
Parallel imports with piracy: the case ic
The last case we are going to analyze is the one where parallel imports are coming from the foreign country to the home country, and the pirates are active in the foreign country. The monopolist's problem in this case is
denote the solution to (10). 5 Comparing the first-order condition (10) with (3), we see that 
Proposition 7 CS
For the foreign consumer surplus, we can use the same argument as used in equation (9). Finally, for the profit, we have the following chains of inequality:
Welfare comparison
When we compare the results of the case c with the results of the case ic, it turns out that the comparison will look very similar to the comparison we have made between the case o and the case i. Namely, whichever there is piracy or not, the effects of allowing parallel imports on the prices, profits, and consumer surplus are qualitatively similar. Specifically, when examining the case o and case i, the key condition was whether η ≥ α or η ≤ α, as seen in Proposition 3 to 6. On the other hand, for comparing the case c with the case ic, the key condition is the one in which η is replaced by (1 − β) η + βc. That is, the similar propositions to Proposition 3 to 6 are derived by comparing (1 − β) η + βc with α. Because of the similarity, we just present those results without proofs and discussions.
In addition, for the foreign consumers, parallel importing is preferable if and only if p
This is because the functional form of the foreign consumer surplus when there is piracy is the same whether there are parallel imports or not, and the foreign consumer surplus is a decreasing function of p f (see equation (8)).
Let us move on to the graphical representation of the results on η-t plane. We are going to draw
curve on this plane, and compare the location of these curves with the corresponding curves comparing the case i with the case o. Before, when we compare the case i with the case o, the focal point which all curves pass through was (η, t) = ¡ α,
1−α 2
¢ . Now, in comparing the case ic and the case c, the focal point is (η, t) =
1−β , the focal point is shifted to the right. Therefore, the curves comparing the case ic with the case c are located to the right of the corresponding curves comparing the case i with the case o. The following propositions formally prove this (see Figure 2 to 5 also).
[ Figure 2 to 5 here.]
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 10 If CS
, which is already shown in Proposition 7.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In terms of the graph, these propositions fix the location of the curves that compare the case ic with the case c, in relative to the corresponding curves that compare the case i with the case o, and show that these curves do not cross each other. For welfare of the home country, however, we are not able to derive the similar proposition. Although in Figure 4 we draw that the
we cannot exclude the possibility that these two curves cross.
Proposition 9 suggests that piracy of the product in the foreign country makes parallel importing less preferable for the monopolist, in the sense that there is a set of the parameter values at which the monopolist prefers parallel imports if there is no piracy, but it does not prefer parallel imports if there is piracy (see Figure 2) . In a similar sense, Proposition 10 shows that piracy makes the parallel imports more preferable for the home consumers (see Figure 3 ). These findings seem quite intuitive: to the monopolist, piracy does harm, and it makes parallel imports less beneficial;
to the home consumers, piracy does no harm, and it makes parallel imports more beneficial.
On the other hand, the result regarding the foreign consumers may seem counterintuitive: as shown in Proposition 11 (see Figure 5 , too), piracy makes parallel imports less preferable for the foreign consumers, although piracy itself benefits the foreign consumers. This is understood by recalling that the foreign consumers can be made better off by parallel imports only if the price of foreign version is decreased by parallel imports. Since piracy lowers the price of the foreign version, as piracy is allowed in the foreign country, there is less room for the price of foreign version to be decreased further by parallel imports. Therefore, as piracy is allowed parallel imports become less preferable for the foreign consumers.
Policy game
In this section, we discuss an issue of policy choices by the home government and the foreign government. Suppose that the home government and the foreign government are welfare maximizer.
Here, it is reasonable to assume that the policy choice of the home government is to allow or ban parallel imports, and that of the foreign government is to allow or ban piracy. Since welfare of the home country and that of the foreign country depend on parallel importing and piracy, when allowing or banning those activities becomes a policy choice, the welfare of each country becomes interdependent on each-other's policy choice. Thus, we consider the following policy-choice game, where the home government and the foreign government move simultaneously.
Foreign Government
Allow piracy Ban piracy
From the analysis so far, we know that allowing piracy is the dominant strategy of the foreign government. Therefore, the equilibrium of the game is either "allowing parallel imports, allowing piracy" or "banning parallel imports, allowing piracy," namely, the outcome is either the case ic or the case c. The case ic is going to be the outcome if η ≤ α, while the case c is going to be the outcome only when η > α.
It is interesting to point out that there is a possibility of a prisoners' dilemma situation in this policy game. Suppose that η is very large so that
hold. In this case, the home government has a dominant strategy of not allowing parallel imports. The equilibrium of the policy game is then "banning parallel imports, allowing piracy", the equilibrium outcome of the game being the case c. Why both countries prefer the case i over the case c is explained as follows. For the foreign consumers, when η is large, parallel imports are beneficial because they lower the price of foreign version. On the other hand, when β is low, pirated version is of poor quality thus the benefit of allowing piracy is very limited. Therefore, when η is high and β is low, the foreign consumers prefer the case of parallel imports without piracy to the case of piracy without parallel imports.
For the welfare of the home country, consider the following equation:
The first bracketed term, which is negative when η is large, can be interpreted as the welfare loss of engaging in parallel imports. The second term, which is always positive, is the welfare gain to the monopolist of banning piracy. If t is low enough, the welfare loss of engaging in parallel imports is small enough to be outweighed by the welfare gain of banning piracy. Therefore, the home country as a whole can be made better off by moving from the case c to the case i.
In this prisoners' dilemma situation, therefore, the home government and the foreign government could be better off through the policy coordination such that the home government switches its policy from banning to allowing parallel imports, and the foreign government switches its policy from allowing to banning piracy. If each government is able to commit to its policy choice, it might be beneficial for both countries to negotiate over the issues of piracy and parallel imports together.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the welfare effect of parallel imports under the possibility of product piracy. The key feature of our model is that the monopoly firm sells its product in two countries of different income levels, and that parallel imports are considered having a low quality.
In the first half of the paper where we focused purely on parallel imports, we found that there is no clear-cut answer whether parallel imports are beneficial or harmful to the monopolist or to the consumers. Our model suggests that it crucially depends on the relative income size of the two countries and the relative quality of parallel imports. In the second half of the paper, where we incorporated product piracy, we found that product piracy makes parallel imports more likely to be beneficial to the consumers and less likely to be beneficial to the monopoly firm. We also pointed out that a policy regarding piracy can be internationally coordinated with a policy regarding parallel imports, so as to improve the welfare of international economy.
As a study of intellectual property right, a limitation of the analysis in this paper is that we paid attention only to short-run, static effects of parallel imports and product piracy on national welfare. Namely, we have not taken account of a long-run, dynamic effect of parallel imports and product piracy on, say, the incentives of the firms to keep creating new products. In this sense, our results might be biased against protecting the holders of intellectual property rights.
Incorporating dynamic effects of parallel imports can be an interesting extension of the research.
Appendix A. There is only one
First, in Lemma 2 we show that there are a
curve both of which pass through the point (η, t) = ¡ α,
, from equation (4) and equation (5) it is seen that p i = p o .
In addition, (η, t) = ¡ α,
For the consumer surplus, equation (7) tells that 
curve, it must be in the area left of the η = α line.
Similarly, from Proposition 5, we know that the CS 
where
So, there is only one CS
Proof of proposition 6. 
Lemma 2 implies that there is a
, and we find that the slopes of these curves are the same at (η, t) = ¡ α,
This is because, at (η, t) = ¡ α,
1−α 2
¢ , the following equalities hold:
, and Figure 1 .
Before moving to the next step, we need to show the following lemma.
Proof. Consider the derivative
to consider the p 
